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A B S T R A C T   
Social science literature has documented how the concept of diagnosis can be seen as an interactive process, 
imbued with uncertainty and contradiction, which undermines a straightforward notion of diagnosis as a way to 
identify underlying biological problems that cause disease. We contribute to this body of work by examining the 
process of resolving contradiction in autism diagnosis for adults and adolescents. Autism is a useful case study as 
diagnosis can be a complex and protracted process due to the heterogeneity of symptoms and the necessity to 
interpret behaviours that may be ambiguous. We audio-recorded and transcribed 18 specialist clinical assessment 
meetings in four teams in England, covering 88 cases in two adult, one child and one adolescent (14+) setting. 
We undertook a qualitative analysis of discursive processes and narrative case-building structure utilised by 
clinicians to counteract contradiction.We identified a three-part interactional pattern which allows clinicians to 
forward evidence for and against a diagnosis, facilitates their collaborative decision-making process and enables 
them to build a plausible narrative which accounts for the diagnostic decision. Pragmatism was found to operate 
as a strategy to help assign diagnosis within a condition which, diagnostically, is permeated by uncertainty and 
contradiction. Resolution of contradiction from different aspects of the assessment serves to create a narratively- 
coherent, intelligible clinical entity that is autism.   
1. Introduction 
Diagnosis is traditionally thought of as a way to identify underlying 
biological problems that cause disease. Scholars working in the field of 
sociology have problematized this, claiming diagnosis is a social process 
that involves multiple actors and is context specific (see Blaxter, 1978; 
Brown, 1995; Jutel, 2013; 2009; Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). Some argue 
that uncertainty is central to medical practice (e.g. Beresford, 2006; 
Bursztajn et al., 1986) because diagnosis is an act of interpretation and 
involves transposing clinical research to the idiosyncrasies of the indi-
vidual patient (Tanenbaum, 1993). Atkinson (1995) argues for a 
detailed analysis of how clinicians locate the sources and nature of 
doubt, and express them discursively, arguing that this approach will 
further understanding about how medical knowledge is organised so-
cially and produced through discourse (Atkinson, 1995). 
There is a surge of interest in the conceptualisation of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder, henceforth ‘autism’, as a diagnostic category (e.g. 
Evans, 2013; Eyal et al., 2010; Fitzgerald, 2017; Nadesan, 2005; Sil-
verman, 2013). Despite this, there remain few empirical studies which 
examine in detail how autism diagnosis actually comes about in prac-
tice. In previous work we examined how clinicians diagnosing autism 
produce objective accounts through their situated practices, and 
perform diagnosis as an act of interpretation, affect and evaluation 
(Hayes et al., 2020). This article contributes further to the sociology of 
diagnosis literature by using a discursive approach to examine narrative 
case-building in clinical assessment teams. Autism diagnosis for both 
adults and children can be a complex and protracted process due to 
heterogeneity of symptoms, the necessity of interpreting behaviours that 
may be ambiguous, and a lack of clinical biomarkers (Klin et al., 2000; 
Vllasaliu et al., 2016). It is therefore an ideal case study to explore how 
clinicians, in their role as diagnosticians, manage these complicating 
factors. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Diagnostic uncertainty, contradiction and pragmatism 
Uncertainty and contradiction have long been important topics for 
medical sociology in relation to clinical training (e.g. Atkinson, 1984; 
Fox, 1957; Timmermans and Angell, 2001); pharmaceuticals and 
neuroscience (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2014; McGoey, 2009; Pickersgill, 2011); 
classification, patient/doctor interaction and diagnostic 
decision-making (e.g. Bowker and Star, 1999; Bursztajn et al., 1986; 
Hedgecoe, 2003; Star, 1989; Zayts et al., 2016); medically unexplained 
or contested diagnoses (e.g Armentor, 2017; Dumit, 2006; Jutel, 2011; 
Marks et al., 2016); as well as in science more broadly (e.g. Campbell, 
1985; Edwards, 1999; Fochler and Sigl, 2018; Pinch, 2012; Shackley and 
Wynne, 1996; Star, 2009). 
Atkinson (1984) argues that rather than assuming uncertainty as a 
‘taken-for-granted’ concept within medical sociology, certainty and 
uncertainty reflect different attitudes which may co-exist together. The 
‘moral certainty’ of practical reasoning, experience or routine, is adop-
ted in day-to-day clinical practice; and the uncertainty of theoretical 
discourse is the knowledge of the laboratory (Atkinson, 1995). Freidson 
(1970) argues that clinicians must believe in the efficacy of their actions 
rather than attend to research that identifies the unreliability of diag-
nosis, or is rooted in uncertain findings, for example. These factors lead 
the clinician to be a pragmatist focussed on results and with an emphasis 
on emotional experience, rather than general concepts or probabilities. 
In this way the clinician comes to rely on the ‘authority of his (sic) own 
senses’ (Freidson, 1970, p.170). 
It could be argued, therefore, that the science of medicine is filtered 
through the hands of the experienced clinician, which can outweigh any 
research-based evidence (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). A focus on 
experience may enable the clinician to find pragmatic certainty within a 
context of conflicting evidence and inconclusive tests. 
Gardner et al. (2011) examined how clinicians make sense of po-
tential contradiction in diagnosis of chest pain. Drawing from the work 
of Mol (2002), the authors argue that ontology is fluid and transitory, 
and assembled through interaction between entities in the clinic. By 
following the trajectory of one patient from GP to cardiologist, they 
demonstrate how particular practices assemble information such as 
family background, the impact of exercise and the results of an ECG, that 
then enables the patient’s chest pain to become intelligible as a clinical 
entity (Gardner et al., 2011). Different (and potentially contradictory) 
accounts from these interactions are consolidated through discrediting 
one source of information (the ECG test) enabling the clinician to 
reframe the condition with a sense of coherence. The effect of this 
‘patching together’ (Gardner et al., 2011, p. 849) of multiple accounts is 
to reify the notion into a ‘singular coherent body’ (Gardner et al., 2011, 
p. 848). As with Latimer’s (2013) ethnographic study of dysmorphology, 
clinical judgement within the wider picture is privileged over any single 
test. 
To conclude, Brown (1987) suggests that diagnosis in psychiatry is 
inherently contradictory due to the multiple goals of diagnosis, and the 
acceptance of a task (diagnosis) which is not entirely in the design of the 
psychiatric profession. Multiple external agendas may conflict with 
patient-care objectives, placing the clinician in a potentially ambiguous 
situation. A pragmatic approach to diagnosis may enable clinicians to 
deal with the institutionally-induced competing demands of diagnosis. 
For example, in psychiatric diagnosis, an interview study identified that 
psychiatrists engage in ‘psychiatric workarounds’ such as negotiating 
diagnoses with patients or fudging codes on paperwork (Whooley, 
2010). 
2.2. Diagnosis of autism 
Autism is diagnosed when persistent patterns of difficulty in social 
communication and interaction, combined with restricted and repetitive 
patterns of behaviour, interests or activities are judged to cause signif-
icant impairment in functioning (APA, 2013). The most commonly used 
assessment measure for both adults and children is the Autism Diag-
nostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) (Lord et al., 2000), alongside a 
clinical interview such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised 
(ADI-R) (Le Couteur et al., 2003). The ADOS is an activity-based sem-
i-structured standardised observation tool whereby the person performs 
a number of communication and interaction tasks, and is then scored on 
a range of behaviours such as emphatic or emotional gestures and 
overall quality of rapport. First-hand reports from the patient, and their 
informants (usually a family member) are utilised, and the impact of 
associated impairment on the individual and the family is considered. 
Diagnosis is undertaken, therefore, primarily on the basis of observation 
and informant accounts. 
Deciding where the diagnostic threshold lies can be problematic as 
autism symptoms are distributed as a continuum extending into the 
general population (Constantino 2011; Constantino and Charman, 
2016). Hollin (2017a, 2017b) argues that the work of cognitive re-
searchers in the 1980s/1990s embedded the concept of heterogeneity as 
core to the definition of autism (Hollin, 2017b). Rather than seeking to 
erase uncertainty, Hollin argues, researchers have effectively centralised 
it within the meaning of autism itself, creating a condition that is 
‘determined by its indeterminacy’ (Hollin, 2017b, p617). The implica-
tions for clinical practice are that clinicians are compelled to work 
within a system that requires a categorical diagnosis within a condition 
constructed as an ‘uncertain entity’ (Hollin, 2017a, p209), with the 
resulting potential for ambiguity, uncertainty and contradiction, 
particularly around those that may be considered ‘threshold’ cases. 
2.3. Narrative and autism diagnosis 
There is a significant body of work which demonstrates how narra-
tive is shaped and purposed in medical settings (see Ainsworth-Vaughn, 
1998; Atkinson, 1995; Bosk, 1992; Byrne and Long, 1976; Hunter, 1991; 
Mattingly, 1991; 1998; Mischler, 1984; D. Silverman, 1987) including 
conversation analytic studies into patient-doctor communication (e.g. 
Heritage and Maynard, 2011; 2006; Maynard and Heritage, 2005; Pil-
nick et al., 2009). 
Classic studies of narrative by Labov and Waletzky (Labov, 1972; 
Labov and Waletzky, 1967) argue that, at its most basic, a narrative 
takes the form of two clauses, ‘temporally ordered’ (Labov, 1972). Labov 
found that narrative story-telling formed a basic six-part structure: ab-
stract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda 
(Labov, 1972). Atkinson (1995) demonstrates how, in a haematology 
clinic, clinicians follow a similar narrative case-building process to 
establish a diagnostic outcome, drawing on the temporal facts of a case 
which can serve to ‘scaffold’ uncertainty within a framework of un-
contested assertions. 
Particularly relevant to our study is a body of work exploring autism 
assessment in the US (see Maynard and Turowetz, 2019; Turowetz, 
2015a, 2015b; Turowetz and Maynard, 2019, 2016). Maynard and 
Turowetz claim that there is a universality to the narrative of diagnostic 
practice across social settings and historical periods and this takes a 
structural form in four parts: preface (an introductory narrative); 
possible stories (either tendency – reporting a general propensity to-
wards particular patient behaviour; or instantiation – reporting a single 
instance); typifications (categorical assertions which include diagnostic 
upshots); and story recipiency (how the story is received, supported or 
facilitated by others in the room) (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017; Tur-
owetz and Maynard, 2017). 
The researchers demonstrate how clinicians collaborate in assess-
ment to build a narrative case together, which enables ‘interactional 
progressivity’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017, p. 265) towards diagnosis. 
Rather than simply organising and documenting evidence, narrative 
practices ‘play a constitutive part’ (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017, p. 20) 
in aligning symptoms to disease categories, in this case, shaping autism 
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as they diagnose it in practice. 
2.4. The current study 
Other than Maynard and Turowetz’s study, there remains very little 
work observing how clinicians discuss autism diagnosis together and 
none that we know of related specifically to narrative case-building in 
adolescent and adult diagnosis. The current study takes a narrative focus 
to examine how clinicians make diagnostic decisions together in the 
light of ambiguity or contradiction. It builds on previous work by 
including analysis of diagnosis of adults and young people over the age 
of 14; siting the study in a UK context where the passing of legislation 
between 2009 and 2011 led to the development of adult diagnostic 
services; and specifically looking at how clinicians deal with contra-
diction in their narrative accounts. 
3. Data and method 
3.1. Sample and recruitment 
We purposively sampled teams that specialised in autism assessment 
and who held regular assessment meetings (two in adult assessment; one 
with children; and one with adolescents (14+)). Recruitment was un-
dertaken from an open call to a list of clinical contacts drawn from the 
internet and via the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) 
Clinical Research Network. All teams were located in England and were 
National Health Service (NHS) providers. Three teams were multi- 
disciplinary with specialists from different disciplines (including psy-
chiatry, clinical and educational psychology, speech and language 
therapy, nursing, social work, and occupational therapy). One team 
(adults) was single-disciplinary and primarily included clinical psy-
chologists and assistant psychologists. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants, and ethical approval was granted by the 
University of Exeter ethics committee and by the Health Research Au-
thority (HRA). Patients and families were not present at any meeting. 
3.2. Data collection 
We observed and audio-recorded over 19 hours of data from 18 
autism assessment team meetings, covering discussion of 88 cases. The 
purpose of the meetings was to discuss specific cases after assessment or 
referral. Audio data were transcribed, anonymised and entered into 
Nvivo for data management and initial coding. We used the concept of 
‘information power’ (Malterud et al., 2016) to assess when we had 
adequate data to meet the aims of the study. This involved consideration 
of quality of dialogue, analysis strategy, use of established theory and 
sample specificity. 
3.3. Analysis 
We took a discursive psychology (DP) approach to enable an 
investigation of how participants’ talk created a case for or against 
diagnosis. A DP approach treats discourse as social action, rather than as 
an insight to people’s motivations, emotions or underlying cognition 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992; Wiggins, 2017). Reports are constructed as 
factual by way of a variety of discursive techniques (Edwards and Potter, 
1992) or devices (Wiggins, 2017) such as narrative structure, footing 
shifts, category entitlements and consensus/corroboration. DP attempts 
to work with participants’ own ‘sense-making’ practices (Wiggins, 2017) 
in that it examines how participants orient to the meaning of each ut-
terance – how they make sense of each other in talk. 
The process of analysis followed guidance as outlined by Wiggins 
(2017) and drew from the theoretical framing of DP by Edwards and 
Potter (1992). We first identified sequential phases of the discussions, 
for example, openings, presenting problems, diagnostic recommenda-
tions and closing sequences, enabling us to identify patterns in the data 
and focus on particular features to be analysed. As our interest was in 
diagnostic decision-making, we then searched for points where partici-
pants came to disagreement or consensus about assessment and what 
happened before and after these instances. At these points we identified 
social actions (e.g. requests for information, asking and replying to 
questions, seeking clarification) and examined the presence of discur-
sive techniques as outlined by Wiggins (2017) and Edwards and Potter 
(1992) to consider how reports were constructed as factual. We became 
interested in how clinicians resolved potential contradiction in their 
deliberations. Detailed transcripts were made using Jefferson tran-
scription to enable analysis of the turn-by-turn detail of conversation 
(Jefferson, 2004). We examined the specific sequential positioning of 
expressions of contradiction and their resolution. Finally we returned to 
the complete data set and checked for instances across the data, further 
refining the analysis. The developing analysis was conducted by the first 
author, presented regularly at data analysis sessions, and discussed with 
co-authors throughout to develop and challenge emerging ideas and to 
develop consensus. 
3.4. Note on terminology 
We use the term ‘clinician’ to encompass all healthcare participants 
in this study, defined as members of a registered health profession 
involved in direct patient care. We use the term ‘patient’ to describe all 
people attending autism assessment, however, we understand the limi-
tations and medical nature of this term. 
4. Analysis and results 
Of the 88 cases recorded, 51 were diagnosis specific. Of these 51 
cases, 43 included discussion of potential or diagnosed co-conditions; 24 
were child or adolescent cases and 27 were adults. Twenty-five cases 
were female, 25 were male and one was transgender. There were 27 
cases with a diagnostic outcome declared in the meeting (15 female, 12 
male; 11 adults, 16 children or adolescents) where it was possible to 
track when evidence discussed was contrary to the final diagnostic de-
cision. For the purposes of this study, we only included those cases with 
Fig. 1. Three-part interactional pattern in autism diagnostic discussions.  
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a diagnostic outcome. In four cases the diagnostic decision made was in 
contradiction to the ADOS result (three cases were under-threshold on 
ADOS and diagnosed with autism: one was over-threshold and not 
diagnosed). Two of those cases - one adult and one adolescent (from 14+
team) - are discussed in detail here. 
4.1. Three-part interactional pattern 
Whilst specific details of team discussions varied according to the 
purpose of the case discussion and the participants attending, we found a 
recurrent three-part interactional pattern utilised to account for and 
explain contradictory evidence, illustrated in Fig. 1. First, a ‘constrain-
ing’ preface formed part of the ‘opening’ of the discussion and served to 
set the agenda for discussion and flag up any assessment issues. Second, 
contradictory accounts were given which constituted evidence consid-
ered not to be in alignment with the current diagnostic trajectory. Third, 
there was a realignment of that contradictory account to align with the 
eventual diagnostic decision, enabling resolution and production of a 
coherent diagnostic narrative. In addition, clinicians frequently invoked 
how ‘helpful’ diagnosis would be for the patient or family. This 
temporally flexible device of helpfulness was accommodated at different 
times in the interaction, and provided a rationale for the realigned ac-
count whilst demonstrating orientation to patient-care objectives. 
The three-part interactional pattern was present in 19 of the 27 cases 
with a diagnostic outcome (see Table 1). Of the remaining 8 cases, 6 
were considered to be straightforward with no contradictory accounts, 
and 2 included contradictory evidence but had a ‘neutral’, rather than 
constraining preface. A constraining preface was present therefore in 25 
cases and contradictory accounts were present in 21. In 23 cases, there 
was an invocation of how helpful diagnosis may be for the patient or 
family. In cases where diagnosis was assigned, contradictory evidence 
was most commonly explained by ‘masking’ (n = 13): the development 
of strategies to compensate socially thereby making observation of 
autistic behaviours in assessment problematic. 
4.2. Case 13: Teresa, age 45 
Teresa, a 45-year-old woman, is discussed by a Consultant Psychia-
trist, Catherine, and the Team Manager, Jo, who is an Approved Mental 
Health Practitioner and experienced diagnostician. Catherine has con-
ducted a clinical interview, and Jo an ADOS. The case discussion begins 
with a discussion to identify the patient being discussed. This is followed 
by Catherine’s prefacing statement. 
4.2.1. Constraining preface  
#13 Excerpt 1
Catherine formulates the case (lines 22–24) and announces the po-
tential outcome. Catherine’s formulation sets the agenda: the patient has 
autism but this will not be apparent on the ADOS result. Catherine 
presents this potential contradiction as normative: not scoring and being 
autistic is not an unlikely outcome, perhaps drawing on shared knowl-
edge that the ADOS tool lacks sensitivity - the ability of a test to correctly 
identify those with the condition - when diagnosing women and girls. 
Whilst hedging (‘probably’, ‘I think’) might represent uncertainty about 
the outcome or her memory of it, hedging allows space for disagreement 
without conflict and can be withdrawn or amended depending on Jo’s 
response (Wiggins, 2017). Jo’s response to Catherine’s assertion is to 
agree, both with the statement that is what Catherine thought, and, 
then, with the ADOS result, although not necessarily with the assertion 
that Teresa does have autism. However, this interaction serves to 
strengthen Catherine’s prefacing statement as it corroborates her pre-
dicted assessment, and her receipt of this is one that serves to reinforce 
the accuracy of her view (‘there we go’) and express her certainty. 
During the following exchange the ADOS score is introduced, which 
aligns with Catherine’s formulation, in that a score of two would be 
considered to be consistent with ‘not scoring’, i.e. under-threshold for 
diagnosis. The lack of precision and apparent lack of preparation to 
report the score (line 30) inoculates against any potential claims that Jo 
might be invested in the ADOS score (Wiggins, 2017) and serves to 
downplay its importance in the discussion. Jo’s minimisation of the 
ADOS score, therefore, aligns with Catherine’s initial declarative 
statement. 
The constraining preface sets up the stories that follow (Turowetz 
and Maynard, 2017), flags pertinent issues and allows the teller to 
project the forthcoming story (Jefferson, 1978). In this study, the 
preface does this by including an implicit or explicit prediction or 
judgement about the outcome or suggesting a problematizing factor. 
The preface therefore sets the agenda for the resulting discussion, and 
potentially undermines alternative versions or topics. We do not mean 
by this that there is intention by the opening speaker to constrain, 
rather, interactionally, it serves a ‘shaping’ role as it takes the form of a 
statement against which other evidence must align or contradict: con-
tradicting is generally more difficult in interaction. 
4.2.2. + Helpfulness (temporally flexible) 
Between lines 33 and 45 Jo provides a tendency story – a general 
propensity to a type of behaviour (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017) (‘she 
did tend to do that going off on a tangent on something but she was a bit 
sort of quite rigid too’) which she checks with Catherine (‘did you find 
that with her?); but this is not supported by specific instances of 
autistic-like behaviours. Jo then goes on to describe a particular issue for 
Teresa.  
#13 Excerpt 2
Jo uses intensifiers (‘really’, ‘massive’) which serves to upgrade an 
earlier assessment of Jo’s (‘a bit sort of’) from minimised and tentative to 
significant. The objective description of difficult emotions (line 48) 
further upgrades Jo’s assessment by illustrating Teresa’s distress about 
her difficulties as genuine. Jo’s statement that Teresa has ‘traits’ has the 
effect of more definitively supporting Catherine’s diagnostic statement, 
particularly with the repeated use of ‘definite’, which bolsters the 
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evidence to support a case for diagnosis. 
Jo completes her turn by introducing a functional element to the 
potential diagnosis (‘it would help her’), making a pragmatic argument 
in support of diagnosis. Whilst there is no detailed discussion about how 
the diagnosis might be helpful, this can be seen as an account towards 
diagnosis and enables ‘interactional progressivity’ (Maynard and Tur-
owetz, 2017): not evidence as such but a meaningful way to create 
justification for a decision. 
However, in the next turn, Jo introduces a contradictory account, or 
complicating action (Labov, 1972), which would explain the earlier 
contradiction of a low-scoring ADOS. Unlike this earlier contradiction 
(lines 24 and 30), which is neatly incorporated into a diagnostic 
narrative (because Catherine has predicted a low-scoring ADOS), this 
second complication impedes a straightforward conclusion to the case 
discussion. 
4.2.3. Contradictory account  
#13 Excerpt 3
‘Though’ suggests a forthcoming contrastive element (Maynard and 
Turowetz, 2017, p. 265) – a statement against diagnosis in contrast to 
the trajectory of the meeting, whilst enabling Jo to give an implicit 
explanation for the low ADOS score. Jo embodies her own experience of 
meeting Teresa through her first-person declaration of how this felt (‘not 
overwhelming’) and tentatively queries the evidence for a diagnosis by 
citing ‘good social interaction’. A significant pause here suggests some 
difficulty in expressing this turn, perhaps due to disaffiliation with the 
general narrative towards diagnosis. Good social interaction would, 
generally, be an argument against diagnosis, as diagnosis requires 
‘persistent impairment in reciprocal social communication and social 
interaction’ (APA, 2013). This utterance, therefore, should problematize 
a diagnosis of autism, however, Teresa’s behaviour has already been 
accounted for as autistic (from line 22) and therefore, this statement is 
couched within a context of evidence towards rather than evidence 
against. Jo immediately counters her ‘good social interaction’ assess-
ment with a contrast term (‘except for’) and then introduces a behaviour 
that would support a diagnosis – rigidity – suggesting an ambivalence 
toward a diagnosis. 
4.2.4. Re-alignment with diagnosis 
Catherine responds.  
#13 Excerpt 4
Catherine’s so-prefaced response attends to Jo’s problematizing 
factor, that of good social interaction, and offers a potential explanation 
of ‘adaptations’ for Teresa’s social skills. With reference to her report 
and assessment, Catherine implies that Teresa’s behaviour could look 
like good social interaction but is in fact adapted behaviour (masking) 
(line 61). Catherine appears to prepare to provide a further contrastive 
element (‘but’) (line 66); Jo, however, continues this utterance (line 68) 
which is completed by Catherine. Here Catherine (with Jo’s corrobo-
ration) has again drawn a line under contradiction, not by reporting 
different evidence, but by re-asserting her clinical judgement (‘I think 
she does’). 
Between lines 71 and 95, a colleague is tasked with finding Cath-
erine’s report. While they wait, Jo and Catherine discuss Teresa’s family 
context. On finding the report, several tendency stories are cited by both 
Jo and Catherine related to Teresa’s special interests (Maynard and 
Turowetz, 2017) and then there is a diagnostic upshot or resolution.  
#13 Excerpt 5
Catherine’s rereading of her own report enables her to reassert her 
initial impression (line 96) with Jo’s agreement taking place in line 100. 
Jo suggests that most people would not be able to identify autism in 
Teresa, and Catherine agrees. The interaction here serves both to index 
their professional expertise (lines 103–109) and to preserve it by ac-
counting for why they too initially had some trouble ascertaining Ter-
esa’s behaviours as ‘autism’ (lines 107–108). This sequence serves to fit 
Teresa into a category of autism despite some behaviours that would not 
align with this diagnosis. Catherine and Jo successfully realign Teresa’s 
‘non-autistic’ behaviour within a category of autism by suggesting she 
has adapted her social difficulties to the extent that her social interaction 
appears to be very good, even though she still has underlying autism. 
Following this section, Jo relates an instantiation story which illustrates 
Teresa’s rigid behaviour in assessment, thereby further supporting a 
diagnosis. Further tendency stories (special interests, problems at work 
and difficulties with relationships) follow before a final diagnostic 
agreement.  
#13 Excerpt 6
To summarise this case, clinicians can be seen to engage in a number 
of interactional devices to create a coherent diagnostic narrative for 
Teresa: setting the agenda for the discussion through a constraining 
opening preface; realigning contradictory accounts by discrediting one 
account (ADOS score) and invoking specialist understandings of autistic 
behaviours (adaptations); and making sense of the diagnosis by invoking 
the helpfulness of a potential diagnosis. In this way the potential un-
certainty that might have been indicated by Teresa’s good social inter-
action is managed by a realigned narrative around masking, adaptation 
and utility of a diagnosis, eliminating any expressed ambivalence to-
wards the diagnosis. 
4.3. Case 50: Gabrielle, age 15 
Gabrielle is a 15-year-old girl who has been assessed by two Clinical 
Psychologists, Fatima and Carol; and a Consultant Psychiatrist, Maria. 
The psychologists, who have undertaken the ADOS, identify her 
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Table 1 
Three-part interactional pattern.  
Case 
no 
Age Sex ADOS result Pattern 1. Preface 2. Contradictory 
evidence 
3. Re-alignment Helpfulness Co- 
conditions 
Outcome  
Adult team 1 (11 cases discussed in total, 1 with outcome) 
2 51–60 Male Under 
threshold 
(4) 




Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC  
Adult team 2 (16 cases discussed in total, 10 with outcome) 





Constraining n/a No contradictory 
evidence 
No Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
13 36–50 Female Under 
threshold 
(2) 
Three part Constraining Under threshold on 
ADOS 




14 18–25 Male Too difficult 
to score 
Three part Constraining Traits; social 
difficulties; variable 





Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 




Constraining n/a No contradictory 
evidence 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 






















21 36–50 Female Under 
threshold 
(2) 
Three part Constraining History and AQ10/RQ 




Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
22 36–50 Female Meets 
threshold 
(9) 
Three part Constraining Social interaction ok; 
lot of gesture 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
25 26–35 Male Under 
threshold 
(4) 
Three part Constraining Special interests BEDC (anxiety) Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 











C&YP Team 1 (20 cases discussed in total, 12 with outcome 
28 5–10 Female Under 
threshold 
Two part Neutral Parental report Over-reporting Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
31 14–18 Female Meets 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Over threshold on 





Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
32 14–18 Male Under 
threshold 






Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 










Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
36 14–18 Male Meets 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Good social manner, 
eye contact, social play 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
37 11–13 Male Meets 
threshold 
(9) 
Three part Constraining Other prof and one 
parent believes not- 
ASC 
ADOS is clearly 
above threshold; 
some compensating 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 




Constraining n/a No contradictory 
evidence 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
40 5–10 Female Meets 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Non verbals under 




Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
41 11–13 Female Meets 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Absence of observed 
repetitive behaviours 
Subsequent report of 
repetitive 
behaviours; no other 
explanation 
No Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
42 5–10 Male Meets 
threshold 
(9) 
Three part Constraining Eye contact, non- 
verbals, emotion 
recognition OK; other 
profs believe not-ASC 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
44 5–10 Male Meets 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Gets on well socially, 






Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
(continued on next page) 
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behaviours as relating primarily to anxiety, and score Gabrielle as 
under-threshold (suggests not-autistic). The psychiatrist has conducted a 
clinical interview and has assessed Gabrielle as autistic. Bob is a visiting 
student doctor. After a brief discussion about the weather, Maria opens 
the case discussion. 
4.3.1. Constraining preface  
#50 Excerpt 1
Maria begins the discussion with a request for information (line 6) 
which appears to invite an extended telling. Fatima’s ‘headline’ 
response, therefore, (line 8) seems inapposite. Maria’s follow-up 
response appears to orient to this by pursuing further telling and her 
surprised response to Fatima’s negative score (line 9) sets the agenda for 
discussion as it signals her difference of view. The responses to line 9 
illustrate that this statement is not received passively. Bob aligns with 
Maria’s surprise; and Fatima’s response (‘but we said she’s very 
different’), in contrast to her utterance in line 8, offers a concession to 
the possibility of an autism diagnosis whilst maintaining positive re-
lations with her colleague through suggesting the reasonableness of 
Maria’s position prior to hearing the ADOS score. Through overlapping 
talk, as Fatima and Carol attempt to describe the reasoning behind the 
low score, Maria evaluates the contradiction with a disagreement term, 
suggesting the ADOS isn’t ‘picking her up’, which is repeated by Fatima 
(lines 13–18), exhibiting further concession to Maria. This utterance 
locates responsibility for the contradiction in a failure of the diagnostic 
tool, rather than in the clinicians’ role, treating the tool itself as an active 
agent (Anspach, 1988). It also refers explicitly to a commonly under-
stood shortcoming of the ADOS amongst clinicians: that the ‘true posi-
tive rate’, or sensitivity, of the tool is inadequate in identifying women 
and girls with autism, leading to a diagnostic gender bias (see Lai et al., 
2015; Loomes et al., 2017; Van Wijngaarden-Cremers et al., 2014). 
Fatima begins with a further disagreement in line 14, relative to Maria’s 
position, which is continued in line 23 below. Overall, there is both 
disagreement and agreement taking place at this stage. 
This opening sequence contains three aspects of our proposed 
pattern, thereby serving a comprehensive constraining function: 
preface, contradictory account (low ADOS score) and initial evaluation 
leading to re-alignment to diagnosis (inadequacy of ADOS tool). As with 
Teresa, it is striking that, even without any detailed narrative content 
(either instantiation or tendency stories), there is already an interac-
tional ‘pull’ towards diagnosis at this early stage. It can also be seen that 
this narrative structure provides a social function in maintaining a 
collegial atmosphere whilst there are differences of opinion (Turowetz 
and Maynard, 2017). Maria’s expression of the ADOS as an active agent 
in ‘not picking her up’, serves to distance the psychologists from their 
role in the ADOS result. Together this short interaction provides what we 
term a ‘constraining preface’, ensuring that participants immediately 
understand the key issues that need to be resolved. This is contrary to 
some types of case discussion, where an extended narrative, including an 
introduction to the patient, problem presentation, patient history and a 
chronology of events, is related prior to any clear evaluation of the 
difficulty (Anspach, 1988; Atkinson, 1995). 
The psychologists go on to provide justification for the low ADOS 
score by outlining factors which would conflict with an autism 
diagnosis. 
Table 1 (continued ) 
Case 
no 
Age Sex ADOS result Pattern 1. Preface 2. Contradictory 
evidence 
3. Re-alignment Helpfulness Co- 
conditions 
Outcome 
47 5–10 Male Meets 
threshold 





Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC  
C&YP Team 2 (4 cases discussed, all outcomed) 








High 3di scores; 
‘enough there’ 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 




Three part Constraining Good at recognising 
emotion, social/ 
creative play; some 
gesture; socially 
motivated 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
50 14–18 Female Under 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Under threshold on 
ADOS; good gestures, 








Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 








Compensating No Yes Diagnosed 
ASC  
a Compensating includes: learned behaviours, taught strategies, training (eg in presentation skills), masking and camoflauging; putting on a show. 
b BEDC Better explained by different condition. 
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4.3.2. Contradictory account  
#50 Excerpt 2
Fatima uses intensifiers (‘really great’) to describe behaviours not 
considered to be aligned with autism (lines 23–7), thereby bolstering her 
own position related to the ADOS score. These contradictory accounts 
are then contrasted with a minimised assessment (‘some’) of difficulties 
with understanding relationships and emotions (lines 27–29). On bal-
ance this utterance foregrounds non-autistic behaviours, and provides 
an account for the low score in the ADOS assessment, whilst allowing 
some opportunity for discussion of autistic-like behaviours. The contrast 
term (‘but’) is introduced and the turn is completed by Carol who in-
terjects with their key finding: that Gabrielle is ‘highly socially anxious’, 
upgraded and corroborated by Fatima with, ‘yeah, incredibly so’. 
Carol’s consequent explanation suggests that Gabrielle’s anxiety may be 
impacting her socially. Her repetition of the anxiety assessment 
strengthens the weight of this view by invoking a corroborative agree-
ment with her colleague (‘that’s what we said’). Carol expresses un-
certainty (‘we weren’t sure’) which sidesteps a direct disagreement with 
Maria’s assessment and instead, utilises uncertainty as an interactional 
resource (Pilnick and Zayts, 2014) by allowing space for renegotiation of 
the outcome. The potential for a diagnosis of both autism and anxiety 
offers a concession to Maria whilst maintaining the integrity of the 
psychologists’ ADOS assessment. Whilst hedging and expressions of 
uncertainty may be used in part because Carol actually is uncertain, 
uncertainty markers also work to keep discussion open and flowing 
whilst potentially challenging clinicians who have more experience or 
higher status roles. 
There follows a series of questions from Maria (e.g. ‘what about her 
quality of insight into relationships?‘) and an extensive overview of the 
clinical interview with Gabrielle’s mother, which includes a series of 
reported stories (both instantiation and tendency) from Gabrielle’s 
childhood, including typifying components towards an autism assess-
ment (e.g. ‘she’s not socially curious’). 
4.3.3. + Helpfulness 
During the case discussion, the team considers Gabrielle’s preference 
for a diagnosis and how it might help her:  
#50 Excerpt 3
Here Carol tentatively speculates on the benefit for Gabrielle of 
receiving a diagnostic label, as an explanation for why she finds ‘it’ 
difficult. This interjection, prior to a diagnostic decision, provides 
further justification for a potential positive outcome, in that the 
diagnosis would make meaning for Teresa and offer her an explanation 
for her difficulties as well as allowing her (or indeed anyone with a 
diagnosis) to attribute their difficulties to a medical condition, rather 
than a personal failing. 
4.3.4. Re-alignment with diagnosis 
After further discussion about the source and manifestation of 
Gabrielle’s anxiety, Carol offers a formulation:  
#50 Excerpt 4
Carol accounts for her assessment by categorising Gabrielle as ‘on the 
spectrum’ - and therefore presumably diagnosable - and immediately 
contrasts this by suggesting instead that Gabrielle may be sub-threshold 
(‘but … not far enough along it’) (line 418). This contradictory account 
is then clarified, with a footing shift from ‘my kind of perspective’ to 
‘from the ADOS’, which serves again to lay the difficulty with the ADOS 
and shift responsibility away from the clinician. The frequent pauses and 
hesitations suggest trouble (Jefferson, 1989) or the management of 
psychological business (Wiggins, 2017). Carol is attempting to summa-
rise a diagnostic narrative inherent with conflict and contradiction at the 
same time as holding her turn to enable a full and nuanced account. She 
continues to assert ‘not autism’ but again offers a concession to a diag-
nosis by suggesting she is on the spectrum. Carol’s complex account is 
again translated by Maria (lines 425–6) as an inadequacy of the ADOS, 
thereby providing an alternative account for the failure to reach ‘diag-
nosis point’. The psychologists concur with this analysis (lines 427–8). 
Here the first part of the re-alignment consolidates the inadequacy of the 
ADOS tool. Maria goes on to explain how this can happen:  
#50 Excerpt 5
The second and explanatory part of the re-alignment compares 
Gabrielle to other (’high functioning, intelligent, female’) patients who 
are able to mask symptoms of autism by mirroring and mimicking. Maria 
draws both psychologists into this concept of shared understanding 
(‘we’ve seen that haven’t we’). Both recipients immediately demonstrate 
understanding (lines 431–2) and finally Carol suggests that despite 
Gabrielle’s ability to mask symptoms, there is still a ‘social difference’ 
which would therefore contribute to an autism diagnosis (line 448). 
Here the possibility of learned behaviour becomes a criteria for 
diagnosis and draws on a collective understanding that the ADOS has 
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limitations when assessing women and girls as it is considered that 
women may have ‘subtler’ manifestations of social and communication 
difficulties (APA, 2013) which may not then show on the ADOS 
assessment. Fluctuations of disagreement, agreement and ambivalence 
culminate, via this re-alignment, in consensus. 
5. Discussion 
The study shows how clinicians bring together potential contradic-
tory accounts to create a coherent narrative which then explains 
particular behaviours as autistic. We can see that contradiction caused 
by factors that might disrupt the idea of a ‘typical picture’ (Star, 1989, p. 
73), such as strengths in social interaction; or the absence of others, such 
as repetitive behaviours or interests, are resolved by drawing on clini-
cians’ assumed knowledge. These suppositions are embedded in their 
clinical, practical understanding of what autism does (or does not) look 
like, and are collectively drawn on and understood, virtually unnoticed 
(Pickersgill, 2011). The resolution of contradiction is possible due to the 
certainty that there is a ‘thing’ called autism despite ongoing un-
certainties about aetiology, shifting definitions and lack of specificity 
about its neurobiology (Fitzgerald, 2014). 
Our proposed narrative framework (Fig. 1) demonstrates how the 
interpretation of behaviours that look like’ autism (or not) are managed, 
enabling allocation to the appropriate disease category and the 
realigning of contradictory evidence. These strategies circumvent the 
messiness of diagnosing a condition defined by indeterminacy and am-
biguity, to meet the institutional purpose of categorising behaviours in 
order to ‘do diagnosis’. 
As with Maynard and Turowetz (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017; 
Turowetz and Maynard, 2017) we found that the narrative frame en-
ables an evidential case for diagnosis to be built and constructs the case 
as a subject for medical talk, establishing the boundaries of what is 
important. We note, as do these scholars, that clinicians use different 
story-types (e.g. instantiation and tendency stories) to build a case for 
diagnosis, however, we also have shown that the detail of these stories 
can be minimal and tacit to the extent that understanding is shared or 
implied without being overtly stated. It is possible, for example, for team 
members to discuss the conflicting nature of ‘good social interaction’ 
without explicit detail of how this manifests in behaviours. It is also 
possible to produce a preface without an extended introductory 
narrative. 
We consider our proposed narrative structure as complementary to 
Maynard and Turowetz’s model and flexible in terms of their relation-
ship, in that either pattern may work within the other in the pursuit of 
diagnostic resolution. Our model offers a specific detailed co-produced 
narrative framework by which contradictory accounts are managed 
and as a mechanism by which an impasse can be resolved in interaction. 
Evidence becomes an interactional product, in that the meaning of facts 
and evidence change with their use in discourse (Måseide, 2006), 
through the negotiation and evaluation of contradictory accounts to-
wards a coherent diagnostic narrative. 
Our work further adds to the sociology of diagnosis by demonstrating 
that clinicians consider an autism diagnosis, in some cases, as a prag-
matic construct which enables them to offer patients and families a label 
which may provide understanding and (sometimes) access to support. 
This, in itself, is not a novel finding. Gill and Maynard (2012), examining 
the diagnostic delivery of a label of developmental disability, demon-
strate how clinicians depict the diagnostic label as a tool for positive 
social outcomes for parents, which may enable them to achieve objec-
tives (help and services) for their child. In autism assessment, other 
studies have examined the role of diagnosis in triggering access to ser-
vices (e.g. Grinker, 2007; Rogers et al., 2016; Skellern et al., 2005) and 
drawn on the experiences of patients and families to explore how the 
delivery of a diagnosis provides a sense-making narrative, legitimization 
of experience, relief, exoneration from blame and a positive sense of 
identity (Crane et al., 2018; Hurlbutt and Chalmers, 2002; Jones et al., 
2014; Molloy and Vasil, 2004; Punshon et al., 2009; Russell et al., 2019; 
Russell and Norwich, 2012). In our study, we have demonstrated how 
invoking ‘helpfulness’ – the pragmatic purpose of a diagnosis – can help 
to manage contradiction within the clinical team prior to diagnostic 
delivery, by providing a concrete, logical reason for the action. An 
invocation of ‘helpfulness’ – the potential for positive social outcomes – 
renders the diagnostic label as ‘relevant’, whether or not it sits within 
clear diagnostic boundaries (Gill and Maynard, 2012). 
Further drawing from Gardner (2011), our analysis demonstrates 
that clinical entities are made intelligible by discrediting diagnostic 
accounts (e.g. the ADOS result) which enables the clinician not only to 
reframe the condition coherently but to provide an explanation for its 
dismissal that serves to contribute to the diagnostic narrative. With fe-
male patients in particular, contradictory accounts (a woman with good 
social skills but other autistic-type difficulties) are explained via mask-
ing, for example, which become incorporated into the diagnostic 
narrative as a clinical unified whole. This aligns with contemporary 
thinking that autistic women and girls may present better in social 
interaction than do men and boys because they are better able to mask 
their autistic behaviours. Diagnostic tools based on the phenotype of 
boys with autism, therefore, may lead to under-diagnosis of girls (see 
Attwood, 2007; Bishop, 2015; Hull et al., 2019; Lai et al., 2015; Ryn-
kiewicz et al., 2016; Schuck et al., 2019). Here in the clinical settings 
under study, ambiguities about social behaviour can be explained 
without recourse to debates about how ‘masking’ might be separated 
from socialised behaviours more generally. In other words, clinicians are 
not tasked with examining a wider socio-political context where gender 
expectations inevitably shape behaviour. 
In the autism assessment team, clinicians do not avoid or disregard 
uncertainty (Katz, 1984); the expression of doubt about the ADOS re-
inforces clinicians’ professionalism as those who understand the limi-
tations of the tool (Pilnick and Zayts, 2014). We would suggest that 
expression of ambivalence and ambiguity in this setting is a means to 
deal interactionally with the inherent indeterminacy of the condition; to 
enable less experienced clinicians to raise conflicting issues; and ulti-
mately achieve interactive progression towards collective accountability 
for the decision whilst maintaining a collegial atmosphere. 
6. Conclusion 
The assessment meeting allows for uncertainty, dispute, disagree-
ment, ambivalence, co-existing conditions and a range of other com-
plexities. This is a place where shared specialist knowledge of the 
contradictory and indeterminate nature of autism diagnosis provides 
‘narrative scaffolding’ (Atkinson, 1995) for diagnostic deliberations, 
enabling progression towards diagnosis despite contradictory accounts. 
In the process of assessment, therefore, clinicians contribute to the 
construction of autism as a biological entity rooted in the individual, and 
yet, at the same time, as a condition with symptoms that can be socially 
concealed (via masking, gender, under-reporting or co-conditions) or 
exaggerated (through over-reporting or rehearsing for assessment). 
An individual, diagnostically, can only be autistic or not (Russell, 
2014): we find that the achievement of this diagnostic binary is made 
possible through dispelling ambiguity and contradiction collectively in 
assessment meetings. We have shown how this work serves to coun-
teract potential uncertainty, and utilises contemporary medical un-
derstandings of how autism can be ‘seen’ (and not seen) behaviourally 
within the clinic, and via patient and family reporting. Potential un-
certainty caused by contradictory narratives is resolved through un-
derstanding that autism can be present but not seen (due to 
compensating or masking); seen but not present (due to behaviours that 
‘look like’ autism, such as anxiety); or seen by some and not others 
(when patient and family member accounts conflict, for example). This 
resolution of contradiction from different aspects of the assessment then 
serves to create a narratively-coherent, intelligible clinical entity that is 
autism. 
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[ ] Overlapping talk 
, Upward intonation 
. Falling intonation 
↑ Marked pitch rise 
:: Lengthening of preceding sound 
£ Smiley voice 
(.) Micro pause 
(0.2) Timed pause (tenths of second) 
> < Speeded up talk 
< > Slowed down talk 
So Emphasis 
= ‘Latching’ of successive talk 
.hhh In-breath 
Bu-u- Cut off of previous sound 
◦so◦ Quieter speech 
But Consonant produced more sharply than normal   
Adapted from Hepburn and Bolden, 2013; Jefferson, 2004  
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